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Failure of a Dredged Slope in a Sensitive Clay
D. P. LaGatta
Principal, Geotechnical Engineers, Inc.

S. L. Whiteside
Engineer, Geotechnical Engineers, Inc.

SYNOPSIS
During construction of a new wharf facility in Portland, Maine, an underwater slope
failed during dredging and subsequent driving of piles through the s·lope. The construction and
failure of the slope are described. The major factors which contributed to the failure were:
1) high sensitivity of the silty clay, 2) placement of riprap on the crest of the slope to 4 to 6 ft
above the design elevation, 3) method of dredging which caused high shear stresses and probable
disturbed zones near the toe of the slope, 4) dredging slope steeper than design slope, 5) pile
driving causing localized disturbed zones with low strength around the piles, and 6) sequence of
dredging and pile driving.

INTRODUCTION ·

cular to the bulkhead. The piles in Rows A, R
and C were 18 in. square and the piles in
Rows D, E, F and G were 15 in. square.

During construction of the Merrill Marine
Terminal facility in Portland, Maine, a dredged
slope failed during the dredging and subsequent
driving of piles through the slope. The authors
were engaged to investigate the cause of the
failure.
This paper describes the failure and
the major factors which contributed to the
failure.

The batter piles and the three rows of vertical
piles closest to the bulkhead (Rows E, F, and G)
were driven before the outboard slope was
dredged. The remaining four rows were driven
after dredging. The failure in the outboard
slope occurred during the dredging and sub
sequent driving of the four outboard rows of
piles. The construction sequence is described in
detail below.

SITE AND PROJECT DESCRIPTION
The Merrill Marine Terminal facility is
located on the Fore River in Portland, Maine.
The facility consists of a wharf for shipping
and receiving bulk cargo and storage areas for
bulk cargo. The wharf is located on the tidal
mudflats along the river bank, as shown in
Fig. 1. As originally designed, the wharf was
to consist of a 600-ft section and a 300-ft
section. The slope failure described in this
paper occurred in the 600-ft section. The
300-ft wharf was not completed and was eliminated from the project.

SUBSURFACE SOIL CONDITIONS
The locations of the borings, performed before
the failure in the vicinity of the outboard
slope during the design phase and at the
beginning of construction, are shown in Fig. 1.
The results of the borings showed that the subsurface soil profile at the site consists of the
following strata, proceeding downward from the
ground surface:
very soft organic clayey silt,
soft to medium stiff silty clay, stratified
silty fine sand and clay, glacial till and
bedrock.

The mudflats landward of the wharf were to be
filled in and used as a bulk storage area. The
mudflats are underlain by 40 to 70 ft of very
soft organic clayey silt and sensitive soft to
medium stiff silty clay. Wick qrains were
installed in the area landward of the wharf to
accelerate the consolidation of the soft silt
and silty clay under the new fill.

The organic clayey silt has a natural water
content of 50 to 80%, a liquid limit of 60 to
75%, and a plastic limit of 30 to 40%. It
contains varying amounts of shell fragments,
organic matter, and occasional lenses of silty
fine sand. The undrained shear strength of
the organic silt in the mud flat areas prior
to filling was in the range of 150 to 300 psf.

The wharf was designed as a concrete pilesupported deck with a steel sheetpile bulkhead
located at the landward edge of the deck, as
shown in Fig. 2. The organic silt and silty
clay outboard of the bulkhead were to be dredged
on a 2H:lV slope to El -35 MLW. The piles for
the deck consisted of square prestressed concrete piles spaced at 12 ft on-center parallel
to the bulkhead and 16 ft on-center perpendi-

The silty clay is a glaciomarine deposit with
a natural water content of 25 to 50%, a liquid
limit of 25 to 40%, and a plastic limit of 15
to 25%. It contains occasional thin layers of
silty fine sand. The upper portion of the clay
above about El -40 MLW has been preconsolidated
by desiccation.
In general, the natural water
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content of the silty clay is greater than the
liquid limit (i.e., liquidity index greater than
1.0). Figure 3 shows the undrained shear
strength profile from UU triaxial tests performed during the design phase on silty clay
samples obtained from the borings in mudflat
areas throughout the site. The Su/cyv relationship based on the results of CU tests performed
on the silty clay is also shown. The UU test
profile shows the silty clay to be overconsolidated above about El -40 MLW.
Figure 4
shows the stress-strain curves from the UU
tests. The curves in general show a peak
strength at relatively small strains and a subsequent dropoff in strength. Two of the curves
are relatively flat, but these samples were probably disturbed during sampling or testing. The
water contents of these two samples were greater
than the liquid limit indicating that the curves
should have been more peaked. The shape of the
peaked curves along with the high liquidity
index indicate that the silty clay is very sensitive and is susceptible to significant loss of
strength if the soil structure is disturbed.
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The frequency of silty fine sand layers increases toward the bottom of the silty clay
stratum, and, in many areas, the lower 5 to
15 ft of the stratum consists of stratified
silty fine sand and clay or predominantly silty
fine sand. A thin layer of dense gravelly glacial till, typically no more than 5-ft thick,
overlies the bedrock in some areas and is absent
in others.
Along the sheetpile bulkhead for the 600-ft
wharf, the thickness of organic silt varies from
about 5 ft near the west end to about 20 ft at
the east end. The thickness of the silty clay
ranges from about 35 ft at the west end to about
50 ft at the east end. The soil profile near
the middle of the section where the slope
failure occurred is shown in Fig. 2.

DESIGN OF OUTBOARD SLOPE
Stability analyses during the design phase were
performed assuming a uniform peak shear strength
of 600 psf for the silty clay and assuming the
river level at El 0 MLW. The computed factor of
safety based on this strength was about 1.6. As
part of the analysis of the failure, the authors
performed stability analyses for the design
geometry using the peak shear strength profile
shown in Fig. 3. The computed factor of safety
was about 1.8. The unit weights used in the
latter analyses were slightly less than the unit
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Stress-Strain Curves from UU Tests
Performed During Design

During dredging of the slope at the west end of
the wharf, the contracter had difficulty in
dredging the toe to El -40. Material appeared
to be sloughing from the slope into the excavation. On December 16, 1981, some rotation of
the Row E piles and cracking at the construction
joint were observed. The designers felt that
the pile movement was due to slope movement
caused by squeezing out of soft soils below
El -25 or slumping at the toe. The movement was
considered to be only a local problem. In an
effort to prevent future movement, the contractor was instructed to:

weights used for the design analyses. This difference and the difference in strength assumptions account for the difference in the factors
of safety. However, in each case, the computed
peak strength factor of safety was greater than
1. s.

CONSTRUCTION SEQUENCE
The construction of the 600-ft wharf was
designed to proceed in_ the following steps. In
each construction step, the work progressed from
west to east.

1) Only dredge to El -35 and dredge at a later
time to El -40 for the riprap key.

1) Place backfill on mudflats to El 10 MLW from
the existing shoreline out to about the
bulkhead line.

2) Extend deck beam construction joints 5 ft
past E line so that the pile was rigidly connected to the deck beam.

2) Drive sheetpile bulkhead. The bulkhead was
driven to El -40 MLW from Lines 1 to 24, to
El -50 from Lines 24 to 44, and to refusal
from Lines 44 to 51.

After these changes were made, the piles and
deck beams from Line 1 to 17 and the deck slab
from Line 1 to 11 were completed.

3) Drive batter piles and vertical piles in
Rows E, F, and G.
DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURE
4) Construct cap beam on top of bulkhead and
deck beams out to Row E (construction joint
at the middle of top of Pile E).

After the west portion of the wharf was
completed, the contractor began dredging the
slope for the remaining 400 ft of the wharf
(Lines 18 through 51). The entire slope was
dredged during the period from January 28, 1982
to March 11, 1982. On March 8, hairline cracks
were first noticed in the Row E and F piles from
Line 29 to Line 51. The cracks were located at
the top, inboard side of the piles. The
cracking in the Row E piles became more substantial during March 9-10. On March 11, a 1.5-in.
gap was observed between the bulkhead and the
top of the outboard slope.
At some of the
piles, several inches of soil was mounded up
against the inboard side of the pile, and there
was a depression on the outboard side indicating
that substantial soil movement was occurring.

5) Excavate organic silt outboard of bulkhead,
replace with gravel fill, and place riprap
for crest of outboard slope.
6) Construct deck to 7.5 ft inboard of Row E.
7) Dredge slope to El -35 MLW in berthing area
and El -40 at toe of slope.
8) Drive piles in Rows A through D.
9) Construct deck beams to outboard edge of
deck.
10) Place gravel filter and riprap on slope and
at toe.

Construction was not stopped after the indications of soil movement were noticed. Driving of
the piles in Rows A through D started on
March 16 beginning at Line 18 and proceeding
east. The piles were driven at a rate of about
25 piles every two days. By March 26, the Row C
and D piles from Line 18 to 42 and the A and B
piles from Line 18 to 37 had been driven.
During the pile driving, the cracking in E and F
piles became more severe, and construction was
stopped on March 26.

11) Complete construction of deck.

CONSTRUCTION PRIOR TO FAILURE
Construction of the wharf began in July 1981.
During construction several changes were made to
the above construction sequence. The organic
silt outboard of the bulkhead was not removed
before the gravel and riprap layers were placed.
The contractor and engineer anticipated that the
gravel and riprap would sink into the organic
silt. However, they did not and, as a result,
the crest of the outboard slope was at about
El 5 to 7 MLW rather than the design elevation
of El 1 MLW.

The major area of pile cracking was from about
Line 27 to Line 43. In this area the Row E
piles had cracks up to about l-in. wide and some
were severely spalled exposing the reinforcing
steel. The Row F piles in this area had cracks
ranging from hairline to about 1/4-in. wide.
The Row E and F piles had rotated significantly
toward the outboard about the top of the piles.
Some of theE and F piles between Line 44 and 51,
had hairline cracks.

The outboard slope was dredged by the following
method. The berthing space outboard of the
proposed wharf was first dredged to El -35 MLW
resulting in a nearly vertical 35-ft-high
dredged slope. The slope was then trimmed by
dredging to approximately the design slope of
2H:lV and the toe was dredged to El -40 MLW.

Figure 5 shows the as-built slope geometry at
Line 35. The top of the riprap was at about
El 5 MLW rather than El 1 MLW. In addition, the
dredged slope was steeper than the design slope,
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especially near the toe, and was dredged to
about El -36 MLW rather than El -35 MLW.
After construction was stopped, three slope
inclinometers were installed, two in the failure
zone at Line 35 and one outside the failure zone
at Line 44. The locations of the two inclinometers at Line 35 are shown on the cross section
in Fig. 5, along with movements measured at the
inclinometer locations.

There is no evident difference in the two
strength profiles. By comparison with Fig. 3,
it can be seen that the strength profiles shown
in Fig. 6 are similar to the strength profile
measured during the design phase.
Stability analyses were performed to evaluate
possible causes for the failure. Analyses were
first performed to determine the effect of
placing the riprap to El 5 MLW and dredging the
slope to a steeper slope and slightly deeper
depth than designed. The river was assumed to
be at El -1.5 MLW. The strength profile used in
the analyses was based on the profile shown in
Fig. 6a and was the same used to analyze the
design slope geometry. In the first analysis,
it was assumed that the riprap was placed to El
5 MLW, but the slope was at the design 2H:lV.
The computed factor of safety for this case was
about 1.45 as compared to 1.8 computed for the
design geometry. Next, the stability was analyzed for the as-built geometry with the riprap
to El 5 MLW and the slope dredged steeper and to
El -36 MLW as shown in Fig. 5. The computed
factor of safety for this case was about 1.25.

As shown in Fig. 5, the inclinometer measurements indicated that a deep-seated slope failure
was occurring through the silty clay in the outboard slope. It should be noted that a much
larger amount of movement occurred before the
inclinometers were installed.
At the time in early March when the cracking was
first noticed and in late March when the
cracking became more severe, the river reached
about El -1.5 MLW (1.5 below mean low water) at
low tide. The inclinometers also showed large
amounts of movement during subsequent lower low
tide cycles.

These results indicate that the excess riprap
and overdredging significantly reduced the factor of safety and increased the shear stresses
in the outboard slope. Since the factor of
safety was greater than 1.0 based on the peak
strengths, the strength of the silty clay must
have been reduced in the shear zone for the
failure to have occurred. The method of
dredging which resulted in a near-vertical face
after the berthing area was dredged and the subsequent pile driving probably caused zones of
disturbed silty clay with reduced shear
strength, especially near the toe of the slope.
As a result, the average shear strength along
the failure zone was reduced below the average
peak strength.

ANALYSIS OF FAILURE
After the construction was stopped, the designer
performed a series of borings to investigate the
cause of the failure. The locations of the
borings performed in the vicinity of the outboard slope are shown in Fig. 1. UU triaxial
tests were performed on undisturbed samples
obtained in the borings. The results of the UU
tests performed on samples of the silty clay
from the borings located outboard of the
bulkhead are plotted in Fig. 6. Figure 6a shows
the results for the borings performed within the
failure zone and Fig. 6b shows the results for
the borings located outside the failure zone.
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Silty Clay Undrained Strength Profile from UU Tests Performed
After Failure - a) Within Failure Area, b) Outside Failure Area

about 400 psf from about El -20 to El -40 MLW
and slightly higher above and below. this zone.
An analysis was performed assuming the clay outboard of Row E had been disturbed to the degree
that the strength could be represented by the
profile shown in Fig. 7. The computed factor of
safety for this case was about 1.10.
Localized
zones in the silty clay, especially at the toe
of the slope and surrounding the piles, would be
probably more disturbed with a lower strength in
which case the factor of safety would be closer
to 1. 0.

Analyses were next performed to determine the
average value of shear strength required along
the failure surface in the silty clay for the
factor of safety to equal 1.0. The results
indicated that an average value of about 400 psf
was required.
The strengths measured in the borings within the
failure zone (Fig. 6a) are generally greater
than 400 psf. However, these borings were all
performed at about Row E. No borings were performed between Rows E and A where the potential
for disturbance of the silty clay was the
highest due to dredging and pile driving.
To
evaluate the effect of the sensitivity of the
silty clay on the stability of the slope, the
post-peak strength measured at 10% strain in
each of the UU tests was determined and plotted
in Fig. 7. The shear strength at 10% strain was

Based on the review of the failure, it is felt
that the failure occurred as a progressive
failure caused by disturbance of the silty clay
during construction. The following factors probably contributed to the disturbance of the
silty clay and the progressive failure.
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Pile Driving - Even though the piles were
driven 12 ft and 16 ft on-center the pile
driving probably caused disturbance in the
silty clay. The disturbance may have been
confined to small areas around the piles but
may have resulted in very low strengths in
these areas. These areas of low strength
would have lowered the average shear
strength along the failure surface and
increased the chance of progressive
failures.
The effect of pile driving on the stability
of the slope was evidenced during the
driving of the remaining deck piles and the
replacement piles for the damaged piles
after the wharf was redesigned. As part of
the required redesign, the crest of the outboard slope was excavated to El -5 MLW
before the piles were qriven. Movements of
the slope were monitored during pile driving
using slope inclinometer and tape extensometer measurements. The piles were
installed at a controlled rate of 5 to 8
piles per day. Even with these precautions,
about 1.3 inches of slope movement occurred
during pile driving.
This movement reflects
the sensitivity of the silty clay and the
effect pile driving had on the failure
during which the piles were driven at a rate
of about 25 piles every two days.
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Silty Clay Strength Profile at 10%
Strain from uu Tests Perfomed After
Failure Within Failure Zone

1)

Sensitivity of the Silty Clay -The silty
clay is highly sensitive as evidenced by the
shape of the stress-strain curves and its
high sensitivity makes the silty clay highly
susceptible to disturbance and significant
reduction in strength.

2)

Placement of Riprap Above Design Elevation Placing the riprap to El 5 to 7 MLW rather
than El 1 MLW increased the driving force
and shear stresses in the slope and
increased the chances for a progressive
failure.

3)

Dredging -When the slope was dredged, the
silty clay near the toe of the slope was
unloaded significantly. The shear strength
of the silty clay will reduce somewhat as it
swells under the lower confining stress.
The main effect of dredging on the stability
of the slope was the method of dredging.
The berthing area was dredged to El -35 MLW
first, leaving a near vertical slope at the
location of the toe of the design slope.
The shear stresses and resulting strains
were probably very high near the toe of the

The slope failure at Merrill Marine Terminal
illustrates that the designers must consider the
sensitivity and the shape of the stress-strain
curves of the soils when designing a project.
For soils exhibiting peaked stress strain curves
with subsequent dropoff in shear strength,
applying a generally accepted factor of safety
to the peak strength may not insure that there
will not be a slope failure.
As evidenced at
the subject site, construction techniques can
cause sufficient shear strains to result in the
soils locally to have a significantly reduced
strength.
If the locally reduced strength
causes the average shearing resistance along a
potential failure plane to equal the driving
shear stresses, failure can occur. As a result,
the designer should estimate during design the
reduced shear strength the soils may reach
during or after construction. The factor of
safety selected for design should reflect the
strength used in the analysis, the shape of the
strength vs strain curve, and the potential for
disturbance during construction.
The slope failure at the subject site also
illustrates that monitoring and control of
construction is especially important when
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Sequence of Construction - The piles in
Rows A through D were driven very soon after
the slope was dredged, even though slope
movement and cracking of the Row E and F
piles was observed during dredging. If pile
driving had been delayed and the cause of
the movement investigated, damage to the
piles may have been reduced, and it may have
been possible to implement remedial
measures.

dealing with sensitive soils.
An instrumentation system should be designed to reflect
potential movements during construction, and a
plan of action should be available should the
instruments indicate larger than expected movements. The contractor and the owner should
understand the implications of the instruments
showing unexpected readings.
For example, it
should be understood that construction may stop
in the area where unexpected movement has taken
place. If this issue is carefully explained in
the specifications and during construction
sequencing, potential conflicts over claimed
construction delays may be avoided.
After movements were observed at the west 200 ft section
of the wharf and during the early stages of
dredging of the remaining 400 ft, construction
should have stopped and the cause of the movements evaluated.

CONCLUSIONS
The major factors that contributed to the
failure of the outboard slope were:
1)

Not recognizing the importance on design of
the high sensitivity of the silty clay.

2)

Placement of riprap on the crest of the
slope to 4 to 6 ft above the design elevation.

3)

The method of dredging which resulted in
high shear stresses at the toe of the slope
and, as a result, probable zones of
disturbed clay with significantly lower
shear strength than the strength used in the
stability analysis.

4)

Local zones of disturbance and low strength
in the silty clay caused by driving full
displacement piles through the slope.

5)

Permitting construction to continue very
soon after the slope was dredged, even
though slope movements and cracking of piles
was observed during dredging.

Although several factors contributed to the
slope failure, the authors feel that the main
reasons for the failure was a lack of appreciation of the high sensitivity of the silty
clay and a lack of construction control. The
engineer should consider the sensitivity and the
shape of the stress-strain curve of the soils
when designing a slope or any other structure.
In sensitive soils, the construction must be
closely monitored and controlled to avoid or
detect potential problems and implement remedial
measures to correct problems if they occur.
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